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Abstract 
This paper, building on governmental financial resilience literature, and using data from a 
survey of over 600 local governments in Germany, Italy, and the UK, looks at the role that 
external shocks, anticipatory capacities, and associated perceived vulnerabilities, play in 
determining different organizational response strategies (i.e., “bouncing back” vs. “bouncing 
forward” strategies) at times of crisis. In the face of shocks, higher perceived vulnerabilities 
will especially be associated with bouncing back strategies, whereas the presence of 
anticipatory capacity will be associated with bouncing forward strategies. 
Points for practitioners  
The present study reveals the crucial role of perceived vulnerabilities and anticipatory 
capacities for LGs that face shocks and crises. While organizational responses in the sense of 
bouncing back, e.g., retrenchment, buffering, downsizing, cutback) are strongly linked to the 
associated vulnerabilities, the implementation of bouncing forward strategies (e.g., 
transformation, repositioning, re-orientation) turns out as being mainly dependent on 
anticipatory capacities, which enable organizations to better recognize potential shocks before 
they arise. This emphasizes the importance of developing wider anticipatory capacities within 
LGs as a key element to cope effectively under difficult conditions, and to build and nurture a 
financial resilience culture.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In recent years, governments have faced a combination of multiple environmental shocks that 
have resulted in direct and/or indirect financial consequences. The relevance of these 
phenomena is reflected in an emerging body of research that has focused on how governments 
respond to crises and shocks. Most contributions in this area have described, classified and 
explored types of governmental responses (e.g., Kickert, 2012; Kickert and Ysa, 2014; 
Overmans and Noordegraaf, 2014). However, there is a relative paucity of research into the 
processes taking place at the micro-organizational level, i.e. of the organizational capacities, 
structures and systems which are (put) in place to face shocks, as well as the role played by 
organizational actors’ perceptions in affecting responses (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Similarly, whereas in the past, general management and organization literature has pointed to 
the importance of perceptions, sense making and anticipation in coping with shocks (Weick et 
al., 2005, Somers, 2009), they appear to have attracted less attention in current public sector 
literature.  
This paper contributes to this literature by looking specifically at how governments’ 
responses to shocks are shaped by organizational perceptions of financial vulnerabilities and 
the presence of anticipatory capacities, i.e., capacities that enable organizations to better 
recognize potential (financial) shocks before they arise (Boin et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2013; 
Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2013; McManus et al. 2007; Weick 
and Sutcliffe 2001; Whitman et al., 2013).  
In exploring the relationships among those variables, resilience may prove a particularly 
useful conceptual lens, as shown by recent studies analyzing how governments deal with the 
shocks and disturbances that affect their financial condition (see Barbera et al., 2015, 2017; 
Davoudi, 2012; Linnenlucke and Griffiths, 2010; Mamouni-Limnios et al., 2014; Shaw, 2012; 
Steccolini et al., 2017; Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). Resilience is a multifaceted concept, yet 
two main features have been highlighted as defining it. On the one hand, it refers to the capacity 
to react to crises, bouncing back to an original state (Boin et al., 2010: 8; Linnenluecke, 2017: 
6; Meyer, 1982); on the other hand, it refers to the capacity to anticipate and cope with the 
unexpected, bouncing forward through the enhancement of, or development of new, 
capabilities (Meyer, 1982; Somers, 2009). 
Our paper draws on the conceptual framework of governmental financial resilience 
developed by Barbera et al. (2017) and based on multiple case studies in three country contexts, 
further consolidated through the analysis of about thirty additional cases across 8 countries, 
worldwide (Steccolini et al., 2017). This framework explains how different patterns of financial 
resilience result from the deployment and development of internal anticipatory and coping 
capacities as well as their combinations and interactions with environmental conditions and 
perceived financial vulnerabilities.  
Building on these previous qualitative findings, which identified the important role that 
the presence (or absence) of anticipatory capacities and perceptions of financial vulnerabilities 
have in shaping organisational responses to shocks, the present paper adopts a quantitative 
approach to explore in more depth the roles of anticipatory capacities, and perceptions about 
financial vulnerability. More specifically, it explores the roles played by such factors in driving 
and explaining different governmental responses to shocks as well as how responses are 
affected by the types of shocks themselves.  
The research is based on a survey of German, Italian and UK local governments (LGs), 
the governmental level nearest to the citizens, which provide an array of ‘tangible’ services and 
thus directly affect the quality of life of those they serve. LGs have been significantly impacted 
by recent shocks affecting their finances. The results show that, in the face of shocks, higher 
perceived vulnerabilities will especially be associated with bouncing back strategies, whereas 
the presence of anticipatory capacity will be associated with bouncing forward strategies.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section shortly reviews extant literature and 
presents the conceptual framework and the underlying hypotheses. Section three describes the 
methods. Section four presents the results. The fifth section discusses them and draws 
conclusions, also highlighting the implications for practice and research. 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Our study draws on the concept of governmental financial resilience, whereby governments’ 
ability to anticipate, absorb and react to shocks affecting their finances is the result of the 
interaction of environmental conditions as well as organizational dimensions (Barbera et al., 
2015, 2017; Davoudi et al. 2013; Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Linnenluecke, 2017; 
Linnenluecke and Griffith, 2013; Nelson et al., 2007; Somers, 2009; Steccolini et al., 2017; 
Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). Such conditions and dimensions are discussed further in the sub-
sections below, where hypotheses are advanced and the conceptual framework is presented.  
 
Responses to shocks (dependent variable) 
Prior empirical research has shown that organizations pursue a variety of strategies when coping 
with shocks and crises affecting their finances (see Beeri, 2012; Boyne, 2004, 2006; Hofer, 
1980; Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Schendel et al., 1976). While such strategies have been 
described and classified in various ways, they can be traced back to two main approaches. 
Organizations may embrace bouncing back (e.g., retrenchment, buffering, downsizing, 
cutback) strategies, including increasing taxes and fees, deferring investments, or reducing the 
costs, scope or size of the organization, and selling assets (Barbera et al., 2017; Steccolini et 
al., 2017). Other organizations may embrace bouncing-forward strategies (e.g., transformation, 
repositioning, re-orientation). The latter emphasize self-sufficiency, entrepreneurship and 
innovation by redefining the modes of service delivery and core activities, as well as improving 
existing services or supplying new services either to current, or to new clients (Barbera et al., 
2017; Steccolini et al., 2017). This paper sets out to explore the respective roles of such factors 
in explaining the types of responses of LGs to recent shocks and crises (see figure 1). 
 
Perceived shocks 
External shocks are events that have significant impact on organizations, sometimes even 
materializing the threat of organizational failure. The impact can be direct, such as eroding tax 
bases, or indirect, e.g. due to natural disasters or changes in government policy (see Jones et 
al., 2017). Although the question of whether there exist objective criteria that define when an 
event can be perceived as a ‘triggering’ event in terms of a crisis or shock, or whether the 
existence of a crisis or shock is determined by individual perceptions still seems to be open for 
debate (see Drennan et al. 2014, p. 14 ff.), several scholars highlight the key role that 
perceptions play in dealing with crisis and shock. In particular, they argue that individual 
perceptions as well as managerial interpretation of events determine how much attention is 
dedicated to an event or potential shock and which actions the organization takes in responding 
to a shock or crisis (e.g. Billings et al., 1980; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Pearson and Clair, 
1998; see also Daft and Weick, 1984; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Weick, 1979). Much of the 
literature that has explored governmental responses to the global financial crisis shows that 
governments across the globe have been hit to varying degrees by the financial crisis, and that 
some have responded with only incremental, yet others with more fundamental, measures (see 
Kickert, 2012; Kickert et al., 2013; Peters, 2011). In addition, case studies of LGs in Germany, 
Italy as well as the UK have highlighted that changes in regulations such as taxation limitations 
and devolvement of tasks, or cuts to public expenditure (Barbera et al., 2017; Jones, 2017; 
Papenfuß et al., 2017) can have unexpected and long-lasting effects on the LGs’ finances, and 
impact on public managers’ perceptions and elaboration of ensuing response strategies. In line 
with these findings, it may be expected that when public managers perceive a stronger intensity 
of external shocks, this will translate in stronger responses, both in terms of incremental 
adaptation and buffering (bouncing back) and of more radical transformations and 
repositioning (bouncing forward).  
 
H1: Higher perceptions of external shocks are associated with higher reliance on both 
bouncing back (H1a) and bouncing forward (H1b) strategies 
 
 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability represents the level of exposure to shocks (McManus et al., 2007). Being the 
result of external as well as internal sources, it lies at the interface between the environment 
and the organization (figure 1). Qualitative analyses of LGs financial resilience have shown 
that it is the sense of being able to control the vulnerability and/or influence its sources that 
affects the way shocks are interpreted and subsequently tackled (Maher and Deller 2007, 2011; 
Jimenez 2012; Barbera et al., 2017), something which is also evident in other, more general, 
studies (see also Boin et al., 2010; Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 
2013; Lu and Xue, 2016; McManus et al., 2007; Somers, 2009). Prior qualitative studies 
showed that high levels of vulnerability were associated with coping strategies that built mainly 
on buffering, including efforts on managing internal resources through reducing expenditure 
and downsizing. LGs where the sources of financial vulnerability were regarded as at arm’s 
length and thus manageable, in contrast, exerted a more proactive behavior to shocks and an 
increased ability to pro-actively manage or offset the impact of environmental conditions 
(Barbera et al., 2017; Steccolini et al., 2017). The level of perceived vulnerability will thus be 
expected to have a different effect on LGs’ responses, with higher perceived vulnerability being 
more likely to encourage defensive and risk averse approaches aimed at bouncing back, and 
lower perceptions of vulnerability leaving leeway for more transformative, innovative and 
entrepreneurial approaches. From this follows: 
 
H2: A higher level of financial vulnerability is positively associated with bouncing back 
strategies (H2a), and negatively associated with bouncing forward strategies (H2b) 
 
Anticipatory capacities 
Anticipatory capacities are the tools and capabilities that enable LGs to better identify and 
manage their vulnerabilities and recognize potential shocks before they arise. As such, they are 
not limited to forms of planning, monitoring or risk assessment, but are also related to the 
cognitive aspects of situation awareness and sense-making (e.g. Boin et al., 2010; Lengnick-
Hall and Beck, 2005; Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2013; McManus et al., 2007; Somers, 2009). 
In this context, some scholars have argued that the availability or improvement of anticipatory 
capacities, i.e. the tools and capabilities that enable LGs to anticipate shocks and crises and 
better identify and manage their vulnerabilities, also assist them in (pro-actively) coping with 
shocks and crises (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Somers, 2009). Anticipation allows 
organizations to prepare in advance for coping with shocks, exploring possible routes, 
including re-positioning and re-thinking of services and activities, and setting in place more 
comprehensive strategies to respond to them. Thus, a strongest presence of anticipatory 
capacities is expected to facilitate the adoption of bouncing forward strategies, but not 
necessarily predict the adoption of bouncing back ones. From this follows: 
 
H3: A higher level of anticipatory capacities (i.e. monitoring, information exchange, 
information sharing) is positively associated with bouncing forward (H3b) but not 
bouncing back (H3a) strategies. 
 
The expected effects are summarized in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1: Conceptual framework] 
 
 
METHODS 
The research builds on a survey of LGs in Germany, Italy, and the UK, complemented by an 
analysis of archival data covering financial and socio-demographic aspects.  
 
The unit of analysis: local governments in Germany, Italy and the UK 
All three selected countries are large economies with LGs being responsible for a wide array 
of similar services including, amongst others, social protection, education, economic affairs, 
housing and community amenities, public order and safety and health. They represent however 
different administrative traditions and the number of LGs varies. This is mainly due to the 
relative size of the populations served by LGs in each country. In order to provide a meaningful 
basis for comparison, LGs included in the survey were identified based on a stratified sampling 
approach. The reference population in Italy and Germany is given by all the LGs with more 
than 5,000 inhabitants.1 The reference population in Italy therefore includes 2,411 units while 
the reference population in Germany includes 2,880 units. Given the different distribution of 
LGs across dimensional classes, larger LGs are less represented than smaller ones in the whole 
population. As a consequence, to ensure satisfactory representation of both dimensional classes 
                                                 
1 The smallest LGs (below 5,000) were excluded on the one hand to ensure to have a manageable number of 
responses, and on the other hand due to restrictions with regard to the accessibility of financial data for local 
governments with a population below 5,000 in Germany. In Italy the accessibility of e-mail addresses is a major 
issue. Moreover, smaller local governments (below 5,000) are generally subject to different law requirements with 
regard to their financial management systems, and they enjoy a specific funding system as well as support policies.  
as well as efficiency, all LGs with a population above 15,000 were included in the sample, i.e., 
961 LGs in Germany and 737 in Italy. For LGs with a population between 5,000 and 15,000, 
we selected 50% of local governments (960 LGs for Germany and 837 for Italy) considering 
their geographical distribution (differentiated between East and West in Germany, North and 
South in Italy). Based on lists which include all local governments between 5,000 and 15,000 
per region, we randomly selected local governments from each region. Information on the 
regional distribution of the sample as well as the responses can be found in Appendix 1a and 
1b. In the UK, successive structural change dating back to the 1970s has seen a reduction in 
the number of local government institutions servicing ever larger populations (current average 
population around 150,000). Except for two, all LGs exceed population figures of 15,0002 and 
we therefore decided to include all LGs from three of the four regions3 (a total of 406) in the 
survey. The questionnaire was administered online and respondents were asked to answer for 
their organization as a whole rather than sub-units within it. The questionnaire was sent to LGs’ 
chief executive officers, chief financial officers and service managers (to ensure coverage of a 
variety of comparable public services, social services, public works, culture and leisure were 
taken into consideration). In general terms, the level of seniority of the respondents was chosen 
as it is more likely to have the required departmental/organizational wide view. The email 
addresses were collected from the governmental websites as they are publicly available. To 
ensure the highest possible response rate, at least two reminders were sent in each country.4   
The received usable responses for the analysis come from 295 (15.4%) LGs in Germany, 
268 (16.80%) in Italy and 64 (15.2%) in the UK.  
Non-response bias was assessed by comparing the responses in the questionnaires between 
the first and last wave (i.e. responses generated by a stimulus, see Armstrong and Overton, 
1977, p. 397) for each country. We used an extrapolation method where non-respondents are 
considered to respond similar to late responders (see Lindner et al., 2001). Late respondents 
are defined as those who respond in the last wave of responses, i.e. in response to the last 
stimulus. We compare them with early respondents, i.e. those who respond to the first stimulus. 
Due to the lower number of responses in the UK in total (64), we were not able to identify the 
recommended minimum of 30 respondents based on the first stimulus (see Lindner et al., 2001). 
                                                 
2 One LG has a population lower than 5,000 and one LG falls into the range between 5,000 and 15,000. Source: 
Office for National Statistics 2011 Census data on population estimates for local authorities in the UK: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk.   
3 Northern Ireland was excluded from the study as the 11 local governments here were reorganised in April 2015, 
and as such the period under consideration was not relevant to these very recently created organisations. 
4 The time between sending the survey (in May 2017) and the first reminder ranged between eight days (Italy) and 
fourteen days (Germany). The second reminder was sent after three to four weeks (end of June). For Italy, two 
additional reminders were sent. 
We therefore compared the last wave of responses (32) to the first 50% of responses (32). We 
additionally applied the same procedure for Italy and Germany, and compared the first 50% 
and last 50% of responses. All t-tests yielded no significant differences between the included 
variables. 
 
 
Operationalization of variables  
The variables discussed above and presented in figure 1 were operationalized drawing on the 
literature on resilience, organizational capacities, and governmental financial management, as 
well as the qualitative groundwork put forward by Steccolini et al. (2017). The questionnaire 
was developed and translated to ensure fit in the respective country contexts while preserving 
comparability. Appendix 2 shows how the resilience dimensions were operationalized, and 
table 1 and table 2 provide detailed information on the items that were used to measure each 
dimension.  
With specific reference to shocks, the present study looks at three different shocks, which 
have been mentioned across LGs in eleven countries (Steccolini et al., 2017): the global 
financial crisis, migration5, and (change of) regulations. With regard to financial 
vulnerabilities, four key issues were assessed to analyze if LGs are in control of both external 
and internal financial vulnerability sources: financial autonomy, abundance of financial 
resources (fiscal slack), level of indebtedness and volatility of own revenue resources 
(Hendrick, 2011; McManus et al., 2007; Maher and Deller, 2011). A set of questions regarding 
the perceived presence of anticipatory capacities in LGs were derived from the literature (see 
for more details appendix 2 and table 2). Responses load onto the expected three subcategories 
for anticipatory capacities, consisting of (1) exchange of information with external actors (e.g. 
upper government levels, service providers); (2) monitoring activities (e.g. national policies 
and regulations, citizen’s needs, economic and socio-demographic developments) as well as 
(3) providing staff with sufficient information and fostering an organizational setting that 
encourages problem analysis and information sharing (table 2). The summative variables for 
each subcategory reported acceptable alphas, reaching Cronbach alphas higher than .7 in all 
cases6.   
                                                 
5 In recent years, migration has posed a significant challenge to European countries, but the immigration surge in 
2015 has been a shock to German local governments in particular (see Eurostat 2015). 
6 Appendix 2 shows the results of the factor analysis for Germany and Italy. Due to the low number of responses 
from UK local governments (64), no factor analysis was applied and we only consider them in the descriptive 
analysis based on identified categories. However, the Cronbach alphas for each subcategory exceed .8, therefore 
also pointing to a high internal reliability. 
 In addition to the survey data, archival financial data and published reports were used as sources 
for the analysis7. We included three financial indicators– average debt level, investment ratio 
and current ratio – covering a ten-year period (2006-2015) as well as size as control variables. 
The data were analyzed by means of descriptive statistics and factor analysis. In a further step, 
ordinary least square regression is chosen as the statistical method to test the developed 
hypotheses. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The results of factor analyses as well as descriptive statistics are presented in tables 1 and 2. 
The following sub-section discusses the results of the test of hypotheses, based on the 
regression analysis.  
 
The factor analysis (table 1) reveals that responses load on two different types of strategies (i.e. 
bouncing back and bouncing forward), which were adopted by LGs during the last five years. 
A summative variable of each strategy reported acceptable Cronbach alphas (0.7). As shown 
in table 1, LGs appear to rely more on bouncing forward than on bouncing back strategies.  
 
 
[Table 1] 
 
Respondents generally gave different weights to different types of shocks (table 2) with 
changing regulations being perceived as most important external shocks followed by the global 
financial crisis. Migration, in contrast, seems to have affected local governments only to a 
relatively minor extent.  
 
[Table 2] 
 
The subsequent section explores whether and to what extent governmental responses are driven 
by different types of shocks and crises, financial vulnerabilities and/or by internal capacities 
                                                 
7 We used Aida Pa database and the website of the Ministry of Interior that publish the main financial data for 
Italian LGs, based on year-end financial reports, for Italy, and in the UK Statistics Wales, Local Government 
Finance Statistics (Scotland) and the Department for Communities and Local Government (Statistics at DCLG – 
England). For Germany, the database http://www.wegweiser-kommune.de/ was accessed to obtain financial data 
for the years 2006-2015. 
that enable organizations to better recognize potential financial shocks before they arise. Table 
3 presents the multiple regression models for the antecedents of the two types of strategies 
described above, i.e., bouncing back and bouncing forward. To determine whether Ordinary 
Least Square was appropriate, data were examined for heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity, 
both returning satisfying results. All models achieve good rates for multicollinearity and no 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) higher than 1.75 was reported in the models. The models 
offered reasonable fit for a cross-sectional design. The explained variance ranges between .20 
(bouncing forward model) and .29 (bouncing back model). 
 
[Table 3] 
 
Table 3 shows that bouncing back and bouncing forward strategies were driven by different 
antecedents. While it turned out that all types of shocks show a positive association with both 
types of strategies, therefore supporting the hypothesis (H1) that higher perceptions of shocks 
are related with higher reliance on response strategies, their significance varies. Migration 
shows the strongest effect in the bouncing forward model while regulation shows the strongest 
effect in the bouncing back model. Although being significant, the effect of the global financial 
crisis turned out as comparatively low in both models, barely reaching significance in the 
bouncing back model.  
The main enablers of bouncing back responses are the various sources of financial 
vulnerability, therefore supporting the hypothesis that higher perceived financial vulnerability 
will bring about bouncing back strategies (H2a). The results also show that, as hypothesized 
(H2b), perceived financial vulnerability has a negative association with bouncing forward 
strategies, but its effect is much weaker.  
Moreover, the different dimensions of anticipatory capacities show a positive association 
with bouncing forward strategies of LGs (H3b). However, the impacts vary, with information 
exchange showing the highest and information sharing showing the lowest but still significant 
effect. The association disappears when looking at their relationship with bouncing back 
strategies (H3a).  
The controls suggest that both strategies were negatively associated with a positive current 
ratio covering a ten-year period, while the three other controls turned out as being non-
significant. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Looking at LGs across Germany, Italy and the UK, this study explored the roles of perceptions 
on shocks and financial vulnerability as well as anticipatory capacities in explaining the type 
of strategies adopted to respond to shocks. The analysis shows that perceptions of the most 
important recent shocks, as well as capacities for anticipating them, and financial 
vulnerabilities appear to be relevant in explaining LGs’ strategies in the face of shocks. 
In exploring the links between external shocks, internal conditions and responses to 
shocks, the analysis shows that the reliance upon bouncing back and bouncing forward 
strategies is explained by different factors. Bouncing back strategies (e.g. deferring 
investments, increasing fees) are likely to be found in the presence of high levels of perceived 
financial vulnerability. Conversely, the adoption of bouncing forward strategies (e.g. changing 
service delivery, establishing new services) appears to be positively associated with the 
presence of strong anticipatory capacities (especially information exchange) and to be hindered 
by high levels of financial vulnerability. In looking at these results, it is worth noticing that the 
global financial crisis appears to have less explanatory power than other shocks, probably 
because, while remaining still relevant, its effect may be now fading away in the face of the 
emergence of new shocks. The association between migration and bouncing forward seems to 
be in line with views that the former will require an overall reconfiguration of public services, 
whereas the association between changes in regulations with bouncing back appears to suggest 
that such changes are seen as less wide-ranging and requiring less incisive interventions, or 
interventions that do not put into question the configuration of public services.  
Most importantly, the results highlight that perceptions of high financial vulnerability are 
central in explaining especially reliance on bouncing back strategies. Hence, LGs perceiving 
their financial conditions as being difficult will be less likely to embark on bouncing forward 
actions. Moreover, and conversely, they show the important role played by anticipatory 
capacities in explaining the adoption of bouncing forward strategies, whereas they do not 
appear to play a relevant role in explaining bouncing back strategies. The analysis supports 
previous qualitative findings, as anticipatory capacities appear to co-occur with adaptive, and 
transformative behavior (i.e. bouncing forward), also reducing perceived financial 
vulnerability, while heavy exploitation of buffering capacities may crowd out the development 
of other capacities needed to bounce forward, resulting in higher levels of vulnerability over 
time (Barbera et al., 2017; Davoudi et al., 2013; Meier and O’Toole, 2009; Wildavsky, 1988). 
The study has relevant implications for managers and policy makers as the results reveal 
the relationship between different anticipatory capacities and perceptions of financial 
vulnerabilities and the strategies adopted by LGs to face shocks. While bouncing back is 
strongly linked to the associated vulnerabilities, the implementation of bouncing forward 
strategies when facing difficult times turns out as being mainly dependent on the capacities 
identified above. This emphasizes that, whenever willing to adopt a bouncing forward 
approach, it is important to develop wider anticipatory capacities within LGs as a key element 
to cope effectively under difficult conditions, and to build and nurture a financial resilience 
culture.  
The present study contributed to further developing and operationalizing the dimensions 
of financial resilience, and more specifically anticipatory capacities and perceived financial 
vulnerability, understanding their relevance for LG response strategies. The results are however 
based on a cross-sectional research design and thus present associations. The adoption of a 
longitudinal perspective in future studies may offer additional insights into causal links, as well 
as how strategies evolve over time and under which conditions. The dimensions identified in 
the framework also offer LG actors the potential to better reflect on their own sources and 
levels of vulnerabilities and understand what anticipatory and coping capacities they need to 
assess, nurture, and develop in order to anticipate, absorb and react to shocks affecting their 
finances over time. Finally, as smaller local governments were not taken into consideration in 
this study, further analyses may focus on them to further explore the roles of anticipatory 
capacities in smaller organizations.   
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Figure 1: Analytical Framework  
 
  ( 
 
Table 1: Exploratory factor analysis response strategies (dependent variable) 
     
All items were prefixed with: During the last 
5 years, my local government…. 
(1 = not at all; 5 = to a great extent) 
  
Rotated Component 
Matrix 
Mean 
St. 
Dev. 1 2 
Bouncing forward 2.85 0.68     
changed the way it delivers services 3.02 0.887 0.743   
changed the priorities of traditional activities 2.88 0.920 0.709   
changed its internal structure 3.07 1.079 0.544   
extended its existing services 2.66 1.040 0.739   
established new services 2.60 0.955 0.750   
Bouncing back 2.37 0.69     
reduced existing services 2.14 0.997   0.707 
deferred/reduced investments 2.95 1.235   0.563 
increased fees and charges for its services 2.69 1.005   0.654 
liquidated assets in order to raise capital 2.21 1.062   0.542 
eliminated some services 1.89 0.888   0.783 
Eigenvalue     2.730 2.192 
Explained Variance     27.298 21.921 
 
Table 2: Vulnerability and anticipatory capacities, descriptives and factor analysis   
  Descriptives Rotated Component Matrix 
  Mean Std. Dev 1 
S Global Financial Crisis 3.26 1.126  
S Migration 2.58 1.064  
S Regulations (e.g., changes in tax base, task devolvement) 3.51 1.003  
V Debt level 2.43 1.33 0.753 
V Volatility of own-revenue sources 3.00 0.99 0.857 
V Level of reserves 3.04 1.15 0.837 
V Autonomy 3.15 1.11 0.762 
AC Information exchange with other local governments 3.66 0.86   
AC Information exchange with upper levels of government 3.16 0.91   
AC Information exchange with external service providers 2.93 0.91   
AC Regularly approach professional service providers   2.91 1.00   
AC Monitoring changing national policies and regulations 3.74 0.87   
AC Monitoring changing citizens’ needs 3.46 0.82   
AC Monitoring economic developments 3.37 0.91   
AC Monitoring socio-demographic developments 3.43 0.91   
AC People have the information and knowledge they need 3.56 0.92  
AC Information is shared freely  3.39 0.98  
AC Relevant information is passed on quickly  3.56 0.98  
AC People are encouraged to conduct complete analysis of problems 3.14 1.00  
Explained variance     32.684 
Eigenfaktor     5.229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Results of regression analysis for response strategies 
  Response Strategies 
  Bouncing 
Back 
Bouncing 
Forward 
External Shocks     
     Global Financial Crisis .079* .102** 
     Migration .081** .160*** 
     Regulations (e.g., changes in tax base) .146*** .112*** 
Anticipatory Capacities     
      Monitoring  -.025 .117** 
      Information Exchange  -.004 .173*** 
      Information Sharing -.017 .080* 
Financial vulnerability     
High level of (perceived) financial vulnerability .372*** -.129*** 
Controls     
Size .001 -.014 
Debt Ratio -.007 -.022 
Investing Ratio -.056 -.007 
Current Ratio -.132*** -.077* 
Dummy UK .051 -.076 
Dummy Italy -.106** -.165*** 
R² .285 .201 
Adjusted R² .270 0.184 
F 18.400 11.557 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 1a: Germany, Italy and UK: Main features 
 
 Germany Italy UK 
Population in 2013 80,523,746 59,685,227 63,905,297 
GDP per capita in Euro 2013 34,884.1 26,958.1 31,562.3 
Administrative tradition 
Continental 
European  
federal model 
Continental 
European 
Napoleonic/Southern 
model 
Anglo-Saxon model 
Level of decentralization Federal Unitary ("Quasi") Unitary 
Local government expenditure in % of total 
government expenditure (2013) 
16.3% 28.6% 25.1% 
No. of local governments (LAU 2 2013)    
 Total 11,116 8,092 418 
 Population 5,001-15,000   1,919 1,674 1 
 Population > 15,000     961   737 416 
 Regional distribution of LG > 5,000  Total: 2,880 
 
West: 2,358 
East: 522 
Total: 2,411  
 
North:1,592 
South:819 
Total: 417  
 
England: 352 
Scotland: 32 
Wales: 22 
Northern Ireland: 11 
 
  
Appendix 1b: Germany, Italy and UK: Sample and respondents characteristics 
 
 Germany Italy UK 
Sample    
 Total  1,921 1,574 406 
 Population 5,001-15,000   960   837    1 
 Population > 15,000   961   737 405 
 Regional distribution of sample 
West: 1,586 
East: 335 
North: 1,022 
South: 552 
England: 351 
Scotland: 32 
Wales: 22 
Responding LGs    
 Total 295 (15 %) 268 (17 %) 64 (%) 
 Population 5,001-15,000 157 (16 %) 133 (16 %) -- 
 Population > 15,000 138 (14 %) 135 (18 %) 64 (%) 
 Regional Distribution West: 246 (16%) 
East: 49 (15%) 
North: 200 (20%) 
South: 68 (12%) 
England: 55 (16%) 
Scotland: 4 (13%) 
Wales: 5 (23%) 
Respondent characteristics     
 Age (Median) 51-55 years 51-55 years 51-55 years 
  < 35 years      5.6 %   1.2 % -- 
  36-45 years     15.0 %   9.0 % 11.3 % 
  46-55 years     41.4 % 53.1 % 58.1 % 
  > 55 years     38.0 % 36.7 % 30.6 % 
 Gender (Male/Female) 66.7 % / 33.3 % 57 % / 43 % 79 % / 21 % 
 Education (College/University 
Degree) 
62.8 % 89.8 % 95.2 % 
 Tenure    
  < 10 years 26.3 % 7.0 % 8.1 % 
  10-20 years 18.4 % 25.4 % 21.0 % 
  20-30 years 32.7 % 38.7 % 43.5 % 
  > 30 years 22.6 % 28.9 % 27.4 % 
 Private sector experience 43.2 % 62.1 % 62.9 % 
 
.. 
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Appendix 2: Operationalization of variables 
 
Dimension and definition Operationalization (corresponding Variable in parentheses) 
Methods details 
and references 
Shocks/ Environmental 
Conditions 
Environmental conditions 
comprise the institutional, 
economic, and social 
environment in which local 
governments operate. The 
focus of this study is on 
external shocks that disrupt 
the environmental conditions 
of local governments thereby 
impacting their financial 
condition. 
Please indicate to what extent the following events negatively affected 
your local government's financial situation and rate the impact it had. 
(1=not at all to 5=to a great extent) 
Global Financial Crisis (Global Financial Crisis) 
Migration (Migration) 
Regulations (e.g. changes in tax base, task devolvement) 
(Regulations(e.g. changes in tax base, task devolvement)) 
-- 
Dimension and definition Operationalization (corresponding Variable in parentheses) 
Methods details 
and references 
Vulnerability 
The perceived extent of 
exposure to financial shocks 
and disturbances that may 
affect local government 
finances 
How would you rate the financial situation of your local government in 
terms of the following aspects? (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) 
Our local government is heavily indebted (Debt level) 
The volatility of our own revenues sources (e.g. taxes) is high 
(Volatility of own revenues sources) 
We have enough financial reserves (fiscal slack) to absorb a small 
amount of shock (Level of reserves) 
Our financial autonomy (considering our own revenue sources) in 
general is high (Autonomy) 
Hendrick 2011, 
Maher and Deller 
2011, McManus 
et al. 2007 
Anticipatory capacities  
The availability of tools and 
capabilities that enable local 
governments to better identify 
and manage their 
vulnerabilities and to 
recognize potential financial 
shocks before they arise, as 
well as their nature, 
likelihood, timing, scale and 
potential impacts. In this 
regard, anticipatory capacity 
is not limited to the presence 
of systems in place to plan, 
control, and manage risks, but 
also related to situation 
awareness and sense-making.  
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree to the following 
statements. In order to increase the understanding about our environment... 
(1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) 
we regularly exchange information with other local governments  
we regularly exchange information with upper levels of government  
we regularly exchange information with external service providers  
we regularly approach professional service providers such as 
consultants, or tax consultants/accountants  
(External information exchange) 
we constantly monitor changing national policies and regulations 
we constantly monitor changing citizen’s needs 
we constantly monitor economic developments 
we constantly monitor socio-demographic developments  
(Monitoring) 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree to the following 
statements. In our local government…(1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly 
agree) 
it is considered important that people have the information and 
knowledge they need to respond to unexpected problems that arise 
information is shared freely across functions and hierarchical levels 
when something unexpected happens, relevant information is passed on 
quickly across functions and hierarchical levels 
when something unexpected happens, people in this local government 
are encouraged to conduct a complete analysis instead of providing 
routine solutions 
(Internal information sharing) 
Amniattalab and 
Ansari 2016, Boin 
et al. 2010,  
Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990, 
Jansen et. al. 
2005, Jaworsky 
and Kohli 1993, 
Jones 2105, Lee et 
al. 2013, 
Lengnick-Hall 
and Beck 2005, 
Linnenluecke and 
Griffiths 2013, 
McManus et al. 
2007, Mott 1972, 
Paliokaite and 
Pacesa 2015, Ray 
et al. 2011, 
Somers 2009, 
Stephenson 2011, 
Weick and 
Sutcliffe 2001, 
2006, Whitman et 
al. 2013, Wicker 
et al. 2013, 
Youndt et. al. 
2004 
Response strategies 
The ability to deal with the 
impact of shocks and 
disturbances, becoming 
visible in times of disruption 
(shock) through strategies, 
reflecting, on the one hand, 
the capability to bounce back 
to an original state or, on the 
other hand, the ability to, 
bounce forward through the 
enhancement of, or 
development of new, 
capabilities emphasizing the 
capacity to reorganize as a 
response to, or in 
anticipation of, disturbances, 
alter or reinvent their 
strategies  
During the last 5 years, my local government...(1=not at all to 5=to a great 
extent) 
reduced existing services 
deferred/reduced investments 
increased fees and charges for its services 
liquidated assets in order to raise capital 
eliminated some services 
(Bouncing back)  
changed the way it delivers services 
changed the priorities of traditional activities 
changed its internal structure 
extended its existing services 
established new services 
(Bouncing forward)  
Andrews 2010, 
2011, Jimenez 
2012, 
Overmans/Arnold 
2014, Steccolini 
et. al. 2017, 
Barbera et. al. 
2017, Meyer, 
1982; Somers 
2009, Boin et al. 
2010: 8; 
Linnenluecke 
2017: 6, Meyer 
1982) 
    
Financial indicators (2006-2015) 
Debt level Debt/Operating Expenditures  
Investment ratio Investment/Operating Expenditures  
Dimension and definition Operationalization (corresponding Variable in parentheses) 
Methods details 
and references 
Current ratio (Operating Revenues – Operating Expenditures)/Operating Revenues  
 
 
 
 
